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right existing in the minor alone, 23 nor can they compromise or settle
any right of the minor in their capacity as parents. This is for the
statutory guardian alone.
Although this note is for the purpose of outlining the prescribed
procedure in Kentucky for the compromise and settlement of minors'
tort claims and not to approve or disapprove it as such, nevertheless in
conclusion, it is urged that since the statutory guardian is the only
person who can legally compromise or settle the minors' claims this
procedure should be followed, if at all possible, in order to give the
proper protection to all concerned.
JAMEs T. YOTJNGBLOOD
Meyer's Adlmr., & C. v. Zoll, 119, Ky. 480, 84 S.W. 543 (1905).

EVIDENCE-BURDEN OF PERSUASION
In the early days of trial by jury when the law was an amoeba, instructions were not needed to assist the jury in reaching the result required by the applicable legal theory. As the law progressed, it became evident that the jurors were not equipped to understand and
apply the law. Consequently, it became the duty of the trial court to
give an exposition of the principles of law appropriate to the case,
restricted to the matters in issue in such a manner as to be readily
understood by the mind untrained in the law. It has been said that
although our legal system requires that instructions be made intelligible to a jury, it is not essential that they be useful to the jury.' A
cursory examination of the instructions submitted to the jury in any
civil case will reveal the shameful truthfulness of that writer's opinion.
In a sound legal system there must exist some test of ascertaining
whether a fact exists or does not exist. Some measure or amount of
persuasion must be required. Some degrees of belief must be reached
by those whose duty it is to find the facts. The purpose of this note is
to present and critically evaluate the tests expounded by the courts to
inform the jurors in civil cases as to how they shall determine whether
the proponent has sufficiently satisfied the burden of persuasion. No
attempt will be made to analyze the method employed in each jurisdiction. This note will be confined to the three formulas most frequently used to determine whether the party who has the onus probandi has convinced the jury that his fact propositions are true.
'See note, 42 YALE L. J. 194, 208 (1932).

NOTES AND Comn

.NTs

Preponderanceof the Evidence
The weight of authority seems to be that in most civil actions the
jury must believe from a "preponderance of the evidence" that the
facts set forth by the proponent are true before they may return a
verdict for him.: In order to understand this rule it is necessary to recall certain fundamental propositions with regard to burden of proof.
Normally the plaintiff is said to have the ultimate burden of proof, and
the defendant has the burden of proving any affirmative defense.
Another way of saying it is that a party has the burden of proof as to
any issue introduced by him. Except for certain departures based on
policy considerations, such as the burden of proof as to payment as a
defense being on the defendant, and, perhaps, res ipsa loquitur in certain jurisdictions, the above principles are universally accepted. The
one who has the burden of proof has the risk of jury persuasion, so
that if the evidence is equally balanced as to any issue, the party who
has the burden loses. Thus it becomes necessary to establish some
standard or test to determine the quantum of proof necessary to satisfy
the burden. The preponderance of the evidence test contemplates
that there must be appreciably more evidence in favor of a proposition
than against it before the jury can accept it as true. The test is said to
be qualitative rather than quantitative, since the jury is permitted to
evaluate credibility, and may therefore give greater weight to the
testimony of a single witness on one side than to that of several on the
other. Perusal of any great number of cases on the subject leads one
inescapably to the conclusion that something less than belief is required, and that any substantial excess of value of the evidence on one
side rather than the other will support the burden. The jury is thus
required to find only a greater probability of truth on the one side. It
is not required to be convinced or to believe, which is the requirement
in fraud cases. The difficulty with this conecpt is in conveying it accurately to the minds of the jury.
The reason for the preponderance of the evidence test has been
said to be that where a loss must fall upon one of two persons, it
should fall upon the one who is shown by proof establishing the reasonable probability of the fact to have been the cause of the loss. 3 The
jury by such an instruction is not informed of the amount of belief
which they should have in order to find for the party upon whom has
29

WiGmoRm, EvIDENcE sec. 2498 (3rd ed. 1940); 1 BLASHFIELDs INSTRUC-

TIONS TO JURIES

(1942).

618 (2d ed. 1916); 20 Am. Jur. 1099 (1939); 32 C. J. S. 1046

' Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Springer, 193 Ark. 990, 104 S.W. 2d 195 (1937);
Newman v. Great Shoshone & T. F. Water Power Co., 28 Idaho 764, 156 P. 111
1916); Cincinnati Butchers Supply Co. v. Conoly, 204 N. C. 677, 169 S.E. 415
1933).
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been placed the burden of persuading them of the truth of the facts
which he has alleged. The instruction standing alone does not appear
to furnish the jury with a satisfactory formula since many of them may
not know just what a preponderance amounts to and it is doubted if
any of them will know what elements to consider in determing whether
or not either party has a preponderance of the evidence. This instruction emphasizes the weight of evidence necessary and does not
direct the attention of the jury to the degree of belief which the proponent must produce in their minds before he is entitled to a favorable finding.
Although the decisions are not in harmony, the majority rule seems
to be that it is the better practice for the court not to attempt to define
the term. In some jurisdictions it has been held proper to use the term
"preponderance" without defining it because it is a term that is generally so well understood that to define it would be a reflection upon
the intelligence of the jurors, and that a definition not confined to an
absolutely accurate statement of the ordinary meaning of the term
would lead to utter confusion.4 The definitions given this term when
it has been defined are numerous and varied. Some of these are
"greater and superior evidence", 5 "more credible or probable evidence",6 "best evidence", 7 and "more convincing or satisfactory evidence".8 A Georgia statute defines preponderance of evidence as "that
superior weight of evidence upon the issues involved, which, while
not enough to wholly free the mind from a reasonable doubt, is yet
sufficient to incline a reasonable and impartial mind to one side of
the issue rather than to the other."° Many other definitions in varying
and ambiguous form convey the same or similar notions, and each
court has its store of cases serving as precedents for its own particular
'Keschman v. Scott, 166 Mo. 214, 65 S.W. 1031 (1901); Martin v. St. Louis
S. W. R. Co., 56 S.W. 1011 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900).
'Barnes v. Phillips, 184 Ind. 415, 111 N.E. 419 (1916); Palmer v. Huston, 67
Wash. 210, 121 P. 452 (1912).
'United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 F. 459 (1907).
'Johnstone v. Seattle R. S. Ry., 45 Wash. 154, 87 P. 1125 (1906). But see
Peart v. Perry, 152 Wash. 5, 277 P. 81 (1929).
'Thurman v. Miller, 50 Ind. App. 372, 98 N.E. 379 (1912); Browning v.
Bailey, 216 Mo. App. 122, 261 S.W. 850 (1924).
'I GA. CODE sec. 38.106 (1933). Another statute lists the factors that may be
used by the jury in determining which party has the preponderance of the evidence. "In determining where the preponderance of the evidence lies, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity for
knowing the facts to which they testified, the nature of the facts to which they
testified and the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or
want of interest, and also their personal credibility as far as the same may
legitimately appear from the trial. The jury may also consider the number of the
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number."
GA. CODE see. 88.107 (1933).
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forms of instructions. 10 Nothing is to be gained by a detailed discussion of these cases. The law will be relieved of much confusion when
these definitions no longer have current significance but become only
legal history. When anything more than a simple caution and brief
definition is given, the matter tends to become one of mere words and
the jury, is rather likely to be confused or at least continue in a state
of incomprehension. Most attempts to explain the meaning of this
phrase consist of expressions that need explanation as much as the
term sought to be explained. To refrain from such attempts would be
better since the meaning of the term will not be made more clear by a
multiplication of words. The truth is that there is no measure of the
weight of evidence other than the feeling of probabilities which it
engenders.
A few courts have attempted to enumerate the elements which the
jury may consider in determining the preponderance of evidence,"'
including such factors as the character of the witness, his intelligence,
his reputation for truthfulness, his demeanor on the witness stand, the
number of witnesses, their means of knowledge and their interest, if
any, in the outcome of the suit. This practice while not advisable as a
method of defining the term "preponderance" or explaining its meaning would be of great help in framing a test for the jury, without including the nebulous word itself. However, great care should be
exercised by instructing the jury that enumeration is merely suggestive
and that they are free to consider any other elements, evidence, facts
or circumstances in determining where the greater weight of the evidence lies.
Clearand Convincing Proof
In other groups of cases, the courts have held that certain issues
must be proved by something more than a preponderance of the evi12
dence, e.g., by "clear and convincing proof' or by a similar test.
Many phrases and formulas have been coined to express this amount
of persuasion, e.g., "clear, cogent and convincing", "clear and satisfactory", "definite, clear, and convincing", "clear and irresistible", "clear,
precise and indubitable", etc. This stronger degree of proof has been
required in cases concerning fraud, undue influence, reformation of a
See annotation, 93 A.L.R. 155 (1934).
L. & N. Ry. v. Ward, 61 F. 927 (C.C.A. 7th 1894); Montgomery v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 73 S. C. 503, 53 S.E. 987 (1906). But see: Parker v. Chicago
Ry., 200 Ill. App. 9 (1916).
" Jones v. Coleman, 188 N.C. 631, 125 S.E. 406 (1924); Massie v. Hutcherson, 296 S.W. 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); and see Reiss v. Utter, 173 Wis. 180,
180 N.W. 810 (1921).
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writing, mistake, oral agreements to bequeath by will and other
similar cases.' 3 The reason for such a rule has been said to be that in
such cases a court of equity is exercising one of its highest and most
delicate functions and it should not undertake so important a duty
unless the evidence is of the most persuasive character.14 The rule
means nothing more than that the entire proof together with the surrounding circumstances shall be such as to convince a reasonable
prudent man of the truth of the facts alleged and to dispel any substantial doubt upon the matter.
There should be a clear understanding and definition of what is
meant by "clear and convincing proof'. This instruction speaks of
and emphasizes the weight of the evidence and does not as it should
do, direct the attention of the jury to the degree of belief which must
be produced in their minds before they are entitled to find in favor of
the party introducing the fact. The degree of belief which should
exist before it may be concluded that the asserted fact is true is the
element which should be emphasized and made plain. If a trial judge
tells the jury that the burden is upon a party to prove a specified fact
by clear and convincing proof, he should explain that this means only
that they must find that the fact does not exist unless the evidence is
of such a degree as would convince a reasonable man of its truthfulness. He should confine his instruction to a definition of the issues and
a direction that they are not to consider any part proved unless there
is clear and convincing evidence that would satisfy a reasonable man.
His instruction might well contain a warning that the probability of
its existence need not be so great as to dissipate all reasonable doubt.
It seems rather clear that the rhetorical and flowery language employed in instructions should be eliminated. Words with doubtful or
obscure meanings should be avoided and plain words and phrases
substituted to define the degree of belief which must exist, words and
phrases which do not suggest a test of a nebulous or mysterious nature
should be excluded. Choice collections of glamorous generalities and
aphorisms even though they bear the distinguished imprimatur of a
learned justice of our highest courts should never be used to aid the
jury in reaching their verdict. However helpful they may be in supplying phrases to express a result, they will be found of no value as
guides to a goal. They do not lighten the task of fixing the precise
'9

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,

see. 2498 (3rd ed. 1940); 32 C. J. S. sec. 1023

(1942); see Note, 32 CALIF. L. 1REv. 74 (1944).
"Atha v. Webster, 181 Ky. 581, 205 S.W. 598 (1918); Whitt v. Whitt, 145
Ky. 367, 140 S.W. 570 (1911). It was suggested at an early date that this "clear
and convincing proof' test is applicable only in equity actions and that in jury
trials, the rule is that the issue must be determined by a preponderance of the
evidence. Holt v. Brown, 63 Iowa 319, 19 N.W. 235 (1884).
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meaning of the ambiguous language used in the instructions nor will
they after such meaning has been determined, disclose a process of
solving the pertinent problem.
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Statements that proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt have
been made by some courts in reference to purely civil actions where no
crime is charged. 15 This view is so rare that it is not believed to be of
sufficient import to warrant any extended discussion. Where a crime
is imputed in a civil action, the question as to the amount of proof
necessary to establish the existence of the crime is a matter upon which
there has been some diversity of opinion among text writers and judges.
But there is now no doubt that the general rule supported by the
majority of jurisdictions is that in civil cases, it is sufficient to establish
the existence of a criminal act by such evidence as would suffice to
prove any other fact involved in a civil controversy, usually held to be
a preponderance of the evidence.'0 It is not required to be proved
"beyond a reasonable doubt" as in criminal prosecutions, although one
state holds that a criminal act which is directly in issue in a civil pro7
ceeding must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Should the test be the same in cases where the defendant is charged
with a crime in a civil suit and where he is merely charged with a
civil wrong? It is believed not. Every man charged with a crime is
entitled to the presumption of innocence and the party who brings the
charges should be bound to overcome that presumption by evidence.
It does not follow that a party who is charged in a civil case with
crime or moral dereliction may not have the benefit of good character
and the presumptions of law in favor of innocence. Presumptions, like
probabilities, are of different degrees of strength. To overcome a
strong presumption requires more evidence than to overcome a weaker
one. To fasten upon a person a very heinous or repulsive act should
require stronger proof than to charge him with an indifferent act.
What could be more damaging to reputation than a charge of unchastity, illegitimacy, criminal conversation, use of intoxicating liquors
to excess and the like. To charge a man with willfully and maliciously
setting fire to his own house in order to collect the insurance should
' Lord v. Reed, 254 111. 350, 98 N.E. 553 (1912); Frayler v. United Cork Co.,
14 N. J. Misc. 91, 182 A. 273 (1935); Dickenson County Bank v. Royal Exchange Assurance of London, Eng., 157 Va. 94, 160 S.E. 13 (1931).
"See Ann. 62 A. L. R. 1449 (1929). A very excellent note with an appendix
setting forth the rule in each state appears in 13 Mn4N. L. REv. 556 (1929).
"Mclnturff v. Insurance Co. of N. A., 248 MI. 92, 93 N.E. 369 (1910);
Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Kleiner, 129 IMl.599 (1889); see notes, 1 U. oF Cm. L.
Rnv. 772 (1934); 12 Mm. L. REv. 660 (1928).
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certainly require more evidence than to establish the fact of non-pay-

ment of a note. The social stigma cast upon one charged with a crime
even in a civil proceeding is far greater than that attached by a civil
suit alone. As a noted authority has said:
The right which every man has to his character, the value
of that character to himself and his family, and the evil consequences
that would result to society if charges of guilt were lightly entertained,
or readily established in courts of justice ...have lead to the adoption
of the rule that all imputations of crime must be strictly proved.'

The greater the offense, the greater proof to establish such offense
should be required.
From an early date in Kentucky, it has been held to be error in an
ordinary civil case to instruct the jury that they must believe from a
"preponderance of the evidence" before they can return a verdict for
either party.19 The reason given for this rule is that:
...where a trial court undertakes to place the right of recovery upon
the preponderance of testimony in favor of the plaintiffs or those holding the affirmative of the issue, it often becomes necessary to explain
what is meant by the preponderance of proof, and in doing so a jury

is often misled by the trial court. .

.

. The word preponderance

should be omitted from such instructions, as it is only calculated to
embarass the jury when considering the issue.'

An instruction in Kentucky in an ordinary civil action should contain
the requirement that the jury "believe from the evidence" the facts
submitted for determination before they can return a verdict accordingly.2 ' The jury must be governed in its findings, not by what it
believes, but by what it believes from the evidence. Sufficiency of the
evidence is not to be determined by the number of witnesses since the

jury has the right to give credence to the testimony of one witness over
that of all others.2 2 The use of this type of instruction makes it un-

necessary for the court to resort to the employment of long and involved phrases and sentences in order to explain its meaning to a
jury.23 But a closer examination reveals that the rule requires the pro1818 MiNN. L. REv. 556, 560 (1-929).

"Wall v. Hill's Heirs, 40 Ky. (I T. B. Mon.) 290 (1841).
Ragsdale v. Ezell, 99 Ky. 236, 238, 35 S.W. 629, 630 (1896).
Roman v. McGinnis, 156 Ky. 205, 160 S.W. 928 (1913). In a number of
Alabama cases, it has been held that an instruction which uses the phrase "if you
believe" instead of the appropriate phrase "reasonable satisfaction" is faulty, improper, objectionable, or bad in form and that the trial court does not commit
error in refusing the instruction. Goodwyn v. Gibson, 235 Ala. 19, 177 So. 140
(1937); Pittman v. Calhoun, 231 Ala. 460, 165 So. 391 (1936).
2Vale v. Illinois Pipe Line Co., 281 Ky. 1, 134 S.W. 2d 940 (1939); Smith
v. Ferguson, 256 Ky. 545, 76 S.W. 2d 606 (1934); L. & N. R.R. v. Curtis' Admr.,
233 Ky. 276, 25 S.W. 2d 398 (1929).
But this degree has been held to apply only to ordinary civil actions, a
greater degree being required in cases to invalidate or modify a written contract
by parol evidence, to establish an omission or mistake in a deed, to prove fraud
2
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ponent to meet a heavier burden than is required in other jurisdictions.
How can a juror really believe from the evidence that a certain alleged
fact is true if he has not been clearly and satisfactorily convinced in
his own judgment of the existence of that fact? Must he not be convinced of the truth of that alleged fact before he believes it? To convince is to lead one to believe. Indeed it may be argued that if a juror
believes that a certain fact is true, he cannot do more than believe the
truth of the alleged proposition and he cannot believe evidence which
is not convincing. Thus, the actual effect of the Kentucky rule appears
to require the same degree of belief that is required in those cases
where fraud, mistake, or undue influence is alleged. It is believed that
this places too great a burden of persuasion on the proponent in that
it requires the jury to entertain a stronger degree of belief than is
required in any other jurisdiction. Such a rule is too harsh and should
be modified to conform with the line of authority.
Instructions on burden of persuasion should not state too many
technical rules and if an attempt is made to go into degrees of proof,
it is almost certain to get the matter so complicated that a jury of laymen will have no idea as to what is meant. 24 A short simple instruction

informing the jury that the evidence relied upon by them in finding
for the one party must be more convincing to them and more worthy
of belief than that which is offered in opposition is all that is necessary.
A plain declaration to that effect will be understood by a jury and
should be sufficient to inform them just what is required. The more
the instruction is elaborated upon the more complex it becomes and
the more likely it is to be misunderstood. There is no need for the
court to bother about the "preponderance of the evidence" or "clear
or mistake in a written contract, and other cases where fraud, mistake or undue

influence is alleged. The proof required in such cases is that it must be clear and
convincing. Fordson Coal Co. v. Garrard, 277 Ky. 218, 125 S.W. 2d 977 (1939);
Dehlinger v. Grave, 238 Ky. 461, 38 S.W. 2d 246 (1931); Turner Elkhorn Coal
Co. v. Smith, 218 Ky. 503, 291 S.W. 715 (1927); Goode v. Gover's Ex'r., 212 Ky.

418, 279 S.W. 639 (1926); Farmers Bank &Trust Co., v. Dent, 206 Ky. 405, 267
S.W. 202 (1924). One reason given for this heavier degree of proof is that the
court is exercising one of its highest and most delicate functions and will not
undertake so important a duty unless the evidence be of the most persuasive
character. Whitt v. Whitt, 145 Ky. 367, 140 S.W. 570 (1911).
"See 11 U. OF CiN. L. REv. 119, 191-195 (1937). Judge W. B. Wanamaker
speaking upon the subject of "Instructing the Jury" said that he had prepared and
mailed a questionaire to 2,250 former jurors in Summit County, Ohio. Replies

were received from 843 of the jurors. One question asked was, "What proposition
of law was most difficult to understand?" Highest on the list was preponderance
of evidence. 232 jurors found this instruction the most difficult to understand.
Proximate cause was next with a count of 203. Reasonable doubt was third highest
with a poll of 136. It has been suggested that trial judges be required to conduct
a school of preliminary instructions for jurors before the commencement of their
service, particularly with reference to such general propositions as preponderance
of the evidence, negligence, and proximate cause. 11 U. OF CiN. L. REv. 247, 255
(1937).
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and convincing proof" or to go to the trouble of explaining their meaning. It has been suggested that a charge which would require the jury
in all cases to find the truth of the proposition to be proved would be
accurate, realistic and easily understood if the proposition to be proved
were put in terms of preponderance of probability: in the ordinary
civil case, that the existence of the fact in dispute is more probable
than its non-existence; in the unusual civil case, that its existence is
much more probable than its non-existence; and in a criminal case,
that its existence is so highly probable as to banish all reasonable
doubts. 25 It may be doubted if even the trained legal mind has such
nicely adjusted scales as to determine to a hair on which side the
evidence preponderates. 20 But even the lay mind can know when it
believes that a certain alleged fact is probably true. The truth is that
these high sounding "preponderances" and "clear and convincing
proof' are mere pharisaical conundrums, invented to explain otherwise incomprehensible formulas and have no support in the established facts and policies of our law. As one noted authority has
described them: "a wondrous cobweb of pedantry is here27woven to
occupy the jury's simple mind and the trial Judge's tongue."
We should not have uncertainty, conflict and confusion in our
legal system as to what the degrees of persuasion and belief are or as
to how they should be adequately expressed in instructions to the jury
since it is a problem that affects all lawsuits. This problem should be
so thoroughly explored and so definitely settled that it no longer causes
trouble for either the trial or appellate court. It is not too much to
hope that a proper test can be formulated which will do much to
prevent such confusion. Surely there is much greater chance to prevent
'See 47 H~Av. L. REv. 59, 66-67 (1933); 25 RocKY MT. L. REv. 34, 39
(1952). For proposed statutes defining the presently employed terms upon such a
basis, see 32 CALF. L. REv. 242, 260-268 (1944).
"One judge represented himself to be very adept at such a task however, by
a bare preponderance is sufficient, though the scales drop but a
stating, "...
App. 577, 579
feather's weight in his favor." Leggett v. Ill. Central R. Co., 72 Ill.
(1897). Another legal writer has absurdly stated that a preponderance of the
evidence consists of 51% of the quantum of evidence introduced by both parties,
while clear and convincing amounts to 70% and beyond a reasonable doubt consists of 90%. 54 DIcK. L. REv. 461-462 (1950). This writer however fails to reveal his method of such mathematical conclusion.
'9 WicoRsO , EvmiaEcE see. 2498, 326, n. 1 (3rd ed. 1940). For the opinion
of an experienced juror on this problem see SUrxarn, IMPnmssIONs OF AN AVERAGE

JuiryAfA
40 (1931). He says, "Many jurors have about as adequate an idea of
"preponderance
of evidence' and 'reasonable doubt' as a small boy has of moral
turpitude. All of the judges ...instruct juries as to these two vital points, but
many of the definitions are only language .... Why would it not be a good idea
to have definitions of 'preponderance of evidence' and 'reasonable doubt' given
in standard language, selected by a committee of able lawyers and written to be
digested by the average business man? After a while, at least, jurymen would
have an understanding of them, like the prayers in a prayer book."
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it if a clear guide is furnished the trier of facts than if an unintelligible and confusing guide is given to them.
Therefore, the following suggestive basic instructions are submitted to serve as a means of informing the jury in plain terms as to
what is expected and required of them.
Ordinary civil case-"The court instructs the jury that if you believe that the evidence shows a greater probability of truth than of
falsity you must find for the offeror."
Unusual Civil Case-"The court instructs the jury that if you believe that the evidence shows so much greater probability of truth
than of falsity that a reasonable man would be convinced of its truth
you must find for the offeror."
Criminal cases-"The court instructs the jury that if you believe
that the evidence is so convincing that a reasonable man would not
doubt it you must find for the offeror."
These instructions can be easily adapted to fit the facts of each
particular case and thus inform the jury in plain terms as to the degree
of belief without the use of rhetorical and flowery language. It is believed that such instructions if used would eliminate much of the confusion that exists in the jurors minds after listening to the instructions
given them.
JoN W. MunrY, JR.

ADOPTION-REQUIREMENT OF CONSENT OF NATURAL
PARENT
The typical attitude of courts today with regard to the necessity
for parental consent to the adoption of a child and the importance attached to such consent is illustrated by the recent Arkansas case of
Woodson v. Lee." In construing the Arkansas statute,2 which requires
child for six months next preceding the filing of the petition for
adoption, the court held that the evidence failed to disclose such an
abandonment by the father as to preclude the need for his consent.
Previously a divorce decree had given the mother custody and responsibility for the maintenance and upkeep of the child during
minority with rights of visitation given to the father. The father had
written consent of living parents unless the parent has abandoned the
visited his son every two weeks until sometime before the petition for
1254

S.W. 2d 326 (Ark. 1953).

'ARK. STATS. sec. 56-106 (a), (b) (I) (1947).

